Political Representation in Everyday Life: Feminism

political standard in Everyday Life FeminismExpanding upon Pitkins idea of Representation in Everyday LifeFeminist Politics and the Feminist feces in United States HistoryBackgroundThe nonion of political design is one that is misleadingly straightforward. In viewing this type of design, it is pardon that some people, including scholars, fail to come to an agreement as to a particular definition. semipolitical representation seems to occur when political actors speak, advocate, symbolize, and act on the behalf of others in the political bena, offering individuals a type of political assistance which they would other than lack.1 However, untold query notes that this understanding(a) is not as straightforward as it may seem at first glance. Rather, it leaves the concept of political representation underspecified with septuple dimensions competing with on another.2In onseting to close the gap on this overarching definition, Hanna Pitkin offers a all-around(prenominal) discussion of the concept of political representation in her work The Concept of Representation. Pitkin established quadruple distinct theories of representation formalistic representation, including authorization and business symbolic representation descriptive representation and meaty representation. 3 One bath begin to view real-life historical manikins under the lens of Pitkins theory in order to see if these examples add together into Pitkins overall view. One example that seems to fit Pitkins theoretical model is that of womens rightist apparent motion and the ongoing feminist political front end in the United States. But, in viewing Pitkins theories, it passs clear that Pitkin is vague in certain areas. In viewing certain accounts by researchers on the depicted object of womens liberation movement, it appears that Pitkin doesnt bring her definitions together in the manner that is necessary. Rather, it appears that feminists who credit entry Pitkin in their asser tions, reckon her to lack the real descriptive representation that feminism requires in the domain of U.S. politics. policy-making Representation in Everyday Life FeminismPitkins intravenous feeding types of representation, formalistic representation, including authorized, deals with a situation in which a exercise is de jure empowered to act for another. Symbolic representation, occurs when a leader stands for national ideas. descriptive representation occurs in situations when the representative stands for a group by justness of sharing similar characteristics such as race, sex ethnicity or residence. And, all important(p) representation back outs place in situations when the representative seeks to advance a groups insurance policy preferences and pursuits. 4 In understanding this theoretical basis in footing of the feminist movement throughout United States history, one washstand see that until clean recently, the assumed political actors, both represented and rep resentative were male.5 And, at the amount of money of feminism is the issue of representation itself. As seen in the aforementioned imagination, feminism from an historical standpoint has always involved the proper representation of women, and postmodernism itself tends to heading this agenda, questioning the very identity of womanhood itself in its wake. 6As such, the starting melodic phrase place for a discussion regarding feminist engagement within the ground of political representation can be dated back to Pitkins theories, as Celis and Childs claim that for Pitkin, the crucial dividing line in forms of representation is the distinction amidst standing for and acting for representation. Pitkins argument is seen in feminist involvement in politics in the U.S., as only recently in U.S. history, accommodate women been able to both stand for and act for themselves. 7 Celis and Childs noteMany feminist scholars emphasize a tattleship, albeit half-fastened, between the descr iptive and the essential component of representation being female or standing for is conceived as an enabling measure up for the substantive representation of women or acting for. Thus, the argument here is simple women, when present in politics, are more likely to act for women than men. Crucially, though, this is not a guarantee that they will. Moreover, this relationship is underpinned not by sex, but by gender womens shared experiences.8As such, the idea of being a women equates to standing for women and more generally pushing for the representation of women within a larger group equates with acting for women, and this notion of the quest for extended feminism in the U.S. fits into the model that Pitkin has set forth in terms of representation. The Stanford encyclopaedia of doctrine notes that for Pitkin, disagreements about representation can be partially reconciled by clarifying which view of representation is being invoked (formalistic, descriptive, symbolic and subst antive), as separately view provides a clearly distinctive view for examining representation. 9 In citing Pitkins theories in the landed estate of feminism, i.e. establishing citizenship for women and giving women the vote, the public has sought to establish a subject matter of political representation that allows the people to decide, by establishing fair procedures for reconciling conflicts, which provides egalitarian citizens one way to settle conflicts and issues about the proper behavior of their representatives.10 The U.S., as a nation, fueled by the will of its citizens, advanced the feminist movement by allowing women to achieve a status equal to their male counterparts.In many ways, the feminist movement in the U.S. falls in line with Pitkins overarching theory, making it easy to understand and apply, thus allowing her theories to be utilized by people whom they govern women in particular. And, in this capacity, the notion of acting upon comes straight into play when viewing the female population in the U.S. and their historical represent for equality. Pitkin notes that a representative democracy, which is employ in the United States, is based upon the principle of elected officials representing a group of people, and the two models that are often used to describe representative democracy are the trustee model and the allot model, which are both present in Pitkins democracy. 11 The trustee model allows representatives greater autonomy, permitting them to diagnose the decisions actually going against the interests of their constituents, other than the delegate model, which requires representatives act as a mouthpiece for the wishes of their constituency.12 And, as these two models clearly place confounding demands upon elected officials and political representatives, the journey to change the way representatives act upon and for the substantive representation of women has been a rocky one.Additionally, there is much to learn from the exampl e of feminism as it relates to Pitkins definition of political representation, especially in terms of what Pitkins definitions leave out. Pitkin argues that formalistic (emphasizing institutions that facilitate representation namely the rules that govern how representatives make decisions on behalf of others) and substantive (which includes all of the ways in which representatives act for or on behalf of the represented) representation are the more or less significant types, believing that a representatives identity is only relevant when it is related to his or her actions, noting A representative must first of all be capable of effective action, otherwise he or she is no representative at all.13 However, Childs and Lovenduski noteThe recounting importance, indeed the practical applications and interactions of two of Pitkins concepts of substantive and formalistic sport come under close feminist scrutiny. There is relatively brusk feminist scholarship, theoretical or empirical, on authorized representation. Conceptual, and to a lesser extent, empirical research on symbolic representation is also fair limited. For Pitkin, symbols are often arbitrary with no resemblance to the represented. Assessing the adequacy of symbolic representation relies on whether the representative is believed in, a criterion Pitkin found wanting. For feminists the notion that women are symbolically represented when they believe they are, even if all the representatives are men, is intuitively unsatisfactory.14Additionally, as the feminist movement vehemently argues for the importance of adding the who to the panoptic notion of democracy, often criticizing the how, many have sought to genderize Pitkins categories in an attempt to connect the who to the what to the how and the where or representation.15 As such, there is a myriad of research which seeks to stretch Pitkins theories in order to better define them in the realm of womens substantive representation and the enhancement of the feminist movement. As many of the definitions of womens substantive representation seem to revolve around being a representative of women as well as a pillar of womens interests or on the job(p) on behalf of women, studies that use the term womens substantive representation often take as their point of departure, Pitkins concept of representing as acting for . . . in the interest of.16 This concept was developed in Pitkins text as one of four different concepts of representation, but many argue today that Pitkin never amply explained how these four different views of representation fit together, and as such, the question has become central to the study of gender and politics today. 17ConclusionAs seen, succession Hanna Pitkins concepts of representation are applicable in viewing the history of feminism and the rights of women in the United States, there are certain facets of these concepts which must be adjusted in order to define the representation of women in the most a ccurate way and make Pitkins assertions less vague.In viewing Pitkins theories in relation to feminism and the feminist movement within the United States, it becomes clear that Pitkin is vague in certain areas. In viewing the aforementioned accounts by researchers on the topic of feminism, it appears that Pitkin doesnt bring her definitions together in the manner that is necessary. Rather, it appears that feminists who cite Pitkin in their assertions, find her to lack the real descriptive representation that feminism requires in the realm of U.S. politics. The question that arises then is how Pitkins notion of representation can be adjusted in order to provide women with the descriptive representation necessary. As with any definition comes certain limitation and questions that surround the delimited nature of a term. This is applicable in viewing Pitkins theories in relation to feminism.ReferencesCelis, Karen and Childs, Sarah. The Descriptive and Substantive Representation of Wom en. parliamentary Affairs. Vol. 61. March 2008. 419-425.Childs, Sarah and Joni Lovenduski. Political Representation. 2012. In Waylen, Georgina, Celis,Karen, Kantola, Johanna and Weldon, Laurel (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of sexuality and Politics. Oxford Oxford University Press.Escobar-Lemmon, Maria and Michelle Taylor-Robinson. Representation The slipperiness of Women. crude York, NY Oxford University Press. 2014. Print.Lovenduski, Joni, ed. State feminism and political representation. Vol. 315(1). Cambridge CambridgeUniversity Press, 2005.Pitkin, Hanna. The Concept of Representation. Oakland, CA University of atomic number 20 Press, 1972.Stanford cyclopaedia of Philosophy. Political Representation. Stanford University. January 2, 2006.Web. Retrieved from http//plato.stanford.edu/entries/political-representation/PitFouVieRep on 4 March 2015.Tisosky, Chelsea. Is a Womans Place in the House? An Analysis of Shared Gender and Political Representation. Cornell University Department of policy Analysis and Management. May 7, 2014. 15. Web. Retrieved from https//ecommons.library.cornell.edu/bitstream/ 1813/36336/2/tisosky_thesis.pdf on 4 March 2015.1 Stanford cyclopedia of Philosophy. Political Representation. Stanford University. January 2, 2006. Web. 1.2 Ibid. at p. 13 Pitkin, Hanna. The Concept of Representation. Oakland, CA University of atomic number 20 Press, 1972.4 Pitkin, Hanna. The Concept of Representation. Oakland, CA University of California Press, 1972.5 Childs, Sarah and Joni Lovenduski. Political Representation. 2012. Waylen, Georgina, Celis, Karen, Kantola, Johanna and Weldon, Laurel (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Gender and Politics. Oxford Oxford University Press. 2.6 Lovenduski, Joni, ed. State feminism and political representation. Vol. 315. Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 2005.7 Celis, Karen and Childs, Sarah. The Descriptive and Substantive Representation of Women. Parliamentary Affairs. Vol. 61. March 2008. 419-425.8 Celis, Karen and Childs, Sarah. The Descriptive and Substantive Representation of Women. Parliamentary Affairs. Vol. 61. March 2008. 419-425.9 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Political Representation. Stanford University. January 2, 2006. Web. 1.10Ibd. at p. 111 Pitkin, Hanna. The Concept of Representation. Oakland, CA University of California Press, 1972. 67.12Tisosky, Chelsea. Is a Womans Place in the House? An Analysis of Shared Gender and Political Representation. Cornell University Department of Policy Analysis and Management. May 7, 2014. 15.13Pitkin, Hanna. The Concept of Representation. Oakland, CA University of California Press, 1972. 67.14Childs, Sarah and Joni Lovenduski. Political Representation. 2012. Waylen, Georgina, Celis, Karen, Kantola, Johanna and Weldon, Laurel (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Gender and Politics. Oxford Oxford University Press. 2.15Escobar-Lemmon, Maria and Michelle Taylor-Robinson. Representation The Case of Women. New York, NY Oxford University Press. 2014. Print. 62.16Ibid. at p. 6217Ibid. at p. 62